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Summary
The features of approaches to the classifica-
tion of various models in intergovernmental 
fiscal relations are identified. The main types 
are analysed according to their revenues. Co-
operative federalism is defined. The charac-
teristics of implementing intergovernmental 
fiscal relations in Germany, France, Sweden 
etc. are identified with focus on the analysis 
of internal state federalism.
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Introduction. The integration of Ukraine in 
the European Union and the continuous 
democratization of social relations require 
the transformation of approaches to the 
organization of public power. A milestone 
on this path includes a reform of the local 
governments and the territorial organiza-
tion of administration, inter alia, through 
budget decentralization. Reformers think 
fiscal decentralization should significantly 
increase the capacity of geographical com-
munities and a number of key social and 
economic issues should be solved by com-
munities provided appropriate financial 
resources. However, during the implemen-
tation of the reform of local governments 
certain shortcomings were revealed in the 
system of public administration, mainly in 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. The es-
sence of the reforms included a reduction 
in the financial burden of the State Budget 
of Ukraine by tying the topping up of lo-
cal budgets to certain conditions, but not 
all the territorial communities met the con-
ditions. In this context, and particularly in 
continuing the decentralization of public 
administration, other countries’ experienc-
es need to be studied, especially regarding 
the state governance of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations in the EU, in order to im-
prove Ukrainian legislation and ensure 
closing up to the EU standards.
Academic studies of the problem. Experi-
ences in managing intergovernmental fis-
cal relations have been studied by Yu.M. 
Barsky, A.V. Belyaev, T.V. Grevtsova, V.V. 
Gryshyn, S.I. Gusyev, A.O. Desyatkov, S.I. 
Zavorotniy, Yu.M. Zinchuk, A.P. Kastelyan, 
O.S. Morozova, N.S. Pedchenko , N. I. Pol-
ynyuk and others.
Svitlana Diachenko PhD, Associate Professor, Economic Policy and 
Governance Department, National Academy of Public Administration 
under the President of Ukraine.
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Purpose of this paper. The purpose of this 
paper is to determine the optimum direc-
tions in improving the efficiency of inter-
governmental fiscal relations in Ukraine.
Presentation of the material. Intergovern-
mental fiscal relations exist in any country 
where there are two or more dependent 
budgets of two different public authori-
ties. Traditionally, intergovernmental fis-
cal relations are formed between the cen-
tral budget and the budgets of lower-level 
public administration bodies or geographi-
cal communities. The essence of such re-
lationships is always manifest in relation 
to the budgetary equilibrium and to the 
prevention of budget disproportions. The 
financial content of intergovernmental fis-
cal relations is disclosed because public au-
thorities with sufficient financial resources 
are obliged to prevent increase in financial 
gaps or the deterioration of solvency. The 
indicators of fiscal stability and equilibrium 
directly affect the macroeconomic position 
of the state, and require efficient and oper-
ational management mechanisms precisely 
through intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
But one should not forget about the exist-
ence of intergovernmental fiscal relations 
either, as in this case the parties are equal in 
legal status to the bodies of public author-
ity. The budget is, in this case, considered 
as a financial basis for the performance 
of functions, and intergovernmental fiscal 
relations provide the means of optimizing 
resources and ensuring the achievement of 
goals set by the individual territories and by 
the state.
All this demonstrates the need for a 
continuous improvement in the manage-
ment of intergovernmental fiscal relations, 
since their flexibility and reasonable con-
sideration in allocating budgetary resourc-
es must be in line with the ever-changing 
social and economic needs of the society. 
As for Ukraine, the study of other coun-
tries experiences is important because the 
fundamental reform of the entire system of 
budget relations can be implemented and 
corruption can be overcome through the 
implementation of various management 
mechanisms in the budget.
However, this will only be achieved 
through the implementation of highly ef-
ficient and progressive mechanisms, and 
researchers in this area advocate the need 
for the classification of models in budgetary 
relations, which also depends on the nature 
of intergovernmental fiscal relations.
T.V. Atamanyuk distinguishes three 
main models:
– The first one is based on the full sepa-
ration of individual taxes between the vari-
ous administrative levels of power and on 
the minimization of the central manage-
ment of intergovernmental fiscal transfers;
– the second one is based on the distri-
bution of basic taxes specified by law and 
allocated to the different administrative 
levels of government, along with the cor-
responding shares assigned to the levels of 
the budget;
– the third one is based on sharing the 
common tax base by different levels of 
power with upper limits set for intergov-
ernmental fiscal transfers, subsidies and 
convergence subsidies (Atamaniuk, 2014). 
Research shows that the intensity of inter-
governmental fiscal relations correlate with 
the dependence of the subject managed at 
each level of the administrative-territorial 
structure from the state and on its ability 
to independently solve the problems of ter-
ritorial development.
Incidentally, this approach to the or-
ganization of budget relations is called 
“fiscal federalism” and in methodological 
research this category is defined as follows: 
“Secured by the legislative division of func-
tional powers and responsibilities of struc-
tures at the different levels of power, with 
a parity of differentiation on this basis of 
income and expenditure between them on 
the basis of state social, economic and polit-
ical expediency, social ethics, interregional, 
interethnic and social solidarity” (Fedoso-
va, 2004:650). Budget federalism does not 
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mean the federal structure of budgets and 
their subordination in a way applicable to 
type of subordination of federation subjects 
in states with a federal system. Fiscal fed-
eralism demonstrates another important 
phenomenon – actual financial decentrali-
zation, coupled with a decentralization of 
responsibilities.
The extent of centralization is used as 
a criterion by L. Mirgorodskaya and O. 
Suntsova (Myrhorodska, 2008:16), while 
distinguishing between various models of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations: compet-
itive ones – characterized by the consider-
able fiscal autonomy of regional and local 
authorities and weak links between differ-
ent levels of government, which means that 
the central government does not interfere 
with the problems of financial equalization 
(experts point to the United States as the 
best example); a cooperative model char-
acterized by close cooperation between the 
different levels of government in the pro-
cess of overcoming fiscal imbalances (most 
often in the Scandinavian countries, Ger-
many and Austria).
S.I. Gusev and Yu.G. Shevtsov also use 
the centralization criterion to distinguish 
the dualistic from the corporate model of 
managing intergovernmental fiscal rela-
tions:
– The dualistic model requires the exist-
ence of two budget levels: the federal and 
federal subject, and it is characterized by a 
weak vertical intergovernmental fiscal sys-
tem of relations and a fairly independent 
power of federal subjects;
– The corporate model implies an active 
horizontal alignment policy; the extensive 
participation of regional authorities in the 
redistribution of the national income and 
the active use of external resources allocat-
ed for budget equalization (Gusev–Shevt-
sov, 2001:56–58).
In our opinion, the approach of S.I. Gu-
sev and Yu.G. Shevtsov is more reasonable 
and methodologically more correct, since it 
demonstrates the existence of levels of gov-
ernance and responsibility centres in the 
decisions made.
In this regard, L. A. Kostyrko and N. Yu. 
Velenteychyk point out that the importance 
of a decentralized or corporate model lies 
in the fact that besides a high level of co-
operation between the various public ad-
ministration authorities, and democratic 
rights for citizens and their territorial as-
sociations can be ensured at a high level, 
which improves the efficiency of solving ter-
ritorial problems and increases the budget-
ary rights of territorial communities (Kosty-
rko–Velenteichyk, 2016:29–30). Moreover, 
the latter provides an opportunity for the 
participation of territorial management 
bodies in solving the problems of the geo-
graphical communities and ensuring the 
needs of its social and economic develop-
ment. In other words, the corporate model 
of managing intergovernmental fiscal trans-
fers shows the capacity public authorities in 
the distribution of financial resources.
The decentralization of public adminis-
tration and the extension of powers of lo-
cal governments do not require effective 
budget policies or guarantee budget top-
up. However, the decentralization of public 
administration shifts the emphasis on the 
allocation of financial resources to sub-state 
levels.
O. B. Kaun interestingly notes that in-
stead of new budgeting and budget rela-
tions models, Ukraine needs new mecha-
nisms for budget reallocation (Kaun, 
2001:32–33). That is why this is important 
not to study the very practice of manage-
ment, but modelling the way of its adap-
tation in Ukraine, given the already high 
enough level of decentralization of public 
administration.
Based on Yu.M. Barsky’s research re-
sults, A.P. Kashtelyan distinguishes two 
types of classification in intergovernmen-
tal fiscal relations: by raising income (Ger-
man, US, Chinese, Canadian or classical); 
and by the nature of the decentralization of 
the public administration system (distribu-
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tive or competing federalism) (Kashtelian, 
2014:2). Their conditional separation from 
the first four models is shown in Table 1, but 
the most interesting practice is the second 
one.
Despite the name “Canadian (classi-
cal)”, this model is best illustrated in Aus-
tria, where the structure is federal, but the 
profitable part of the subjects of the federa-
tion, including those taking national needs 
into account, has a clear structure.
Expanding the essence of the distribu-
tive model of intergovernmental fiscal rela-
tions and the model of competing federal-
ism, N. S. Pedchenko considers intergov-
ernmental fiscal relations as an instrument 
in regulating “unequal” living conditions. 
In S. I. Zavorotnyi’s model, each region and 
municipality can have its own fiscal policy if 
it competes for business entities’ financial 
activities, and creates a favourable budget 
climate (Pedchenko–Zavorotnii, 2013:324). 
Such a semantic form – the distributive 
model – actually conveys the objective of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations, namely, 
the equalization of the financial capacity of 
budgets at different levels.
An interesting approach to the classifi-
cation of models of intergovernmental fis-
cal relations is presented in the works of A. 
V. Belyaev and M. M. Turbin, who distin-
guish four of these models:
– A model of ideal federalism – which 
provides a clear separation of budgetary 
relations and the minimization of intergov-
ernmental fiscal transfers (USA);
– A  model of cooperative federalism 
– provides a mutual solution for the need 
and volume of intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers by public authorities at the na-
tional and local (regional, territorial) levels 
(Germany);
– A model of domestic federalism (ob-
ligatory model), which provides for the as-
signment of competences to the different 
levels of public authorities and for concen-
tration of opportunities in regulating inter-
governmental fiscal relations at higher lev-
els of government (in fact horizontal inter-
governmental fiscal relations are excluded, 
see Sweden);
– A  model of domestic federalism is 
characterized by the simultaneous pres-
ence of both horizontal and vertical inter-
governmental fiscal relations (France, Aus-
tria) (Beliaeva–Turbin, 2009:25–26).
In our opinion, this is the most theo-
retically and methodologically correct and 
harmonious classification in terms of pub-
lic authorities’ involvement in intergovern-
mental fiscal relations and the genuine re-
distribution of budgetary burdens. In our 
opinion, practical experiences in organ-
izing intergovernmental fiscal relations in 
Table 1:  Characteristics of models in intergovernmental fiscal relations according to the method of 
revenue raising
German American Chinese Canadian (classical)
Redistribution of to-
tal revenues depend-
ing on the central 
government’s assess-
ment of the needs of 
the regions
Intergovernmental 
fiscal relations arise 
only on condition of 
a partial or short-
term dissolution of 
solvency
Intergovernmental 
fiscal relations are 
characterized by an 
uncertain volume, 
but with the responsi-
bility of the regional 
authorities to transfer 
budget revenues to 
the state budget
Intergovernmental 
fiscal relations are 
characterized by 
a predetermined 
amount of compul-
sory transfer of local 
incomes to the state 
budget
Source: The author based on Atamaniuk, 2014; Waldhoff, 2015; Grevtsova–Garshyna, 2015; Gu-
sev–Shevtsov, 2001; Zakrevska, 2017; Idrisov–Somoev, 2016; Palankai, 2015
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other states are worth studying in the lat-
ter three types only, as ideal federalism is 
unfeasible in Ukraine under the current 
conditions, primarily because the adminis-
trative and budgetary reform has not been 
completed yet.
We agree with O. A. Muzyka-Stefanchuk 
(Muzyka-Stefanchuk, 2011:255–257) and 
N.I. Polynyuk (Polyniuk, 2016:260–273), 
who claim that any particular model of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations demon-
strates the approach to institutionalizing 
the organizational principles of relations 
between the state and local governments. 
Depending on the direction of administra-
tive influence (from top to bottom or on 
the same level of the institutional hierar-
chy), during the allocation of intergovern-
mental fiscal transfers, the pattern of budg-
et relations is identified. It is important to 
understand that intergovernmental fiscal 
relations reflect the manner of enforcing 
the right to local government: in the condi-
tions of civil society, in the principles of self-
development and in the encouragement of 
regional development through administra-
tive influence on local government bodies 
or at the expense of the policy of budgetary 
equalization through centralized state ad-
ministrative influence.
Ukraine seeks to introduce a model that 
includes regional development more as a 
result of the activity of local governments. 
Budget centralization and budgetary equal-
ization has predominated for a very long 
time, and this had an adverse impact on 
local governments and their implementa-
tion ability at a community level. Germany 
is also characterized by a low level of  in-
dependence of provinces from the federal 
government in matters of fiscal policy. Tak-
ing into account the fact that there are 
only three common taxes between the fed-
eral level and the provincial budgets (VAT, 
personal income tax and legal entities), 
and the restriction on local governments’ 
financial activity is directly enshrined in 
the constitution, one can fully agree with 
the statement of O. Kuznetsova that such a 
high level of centralization of budget rela-
tions should be compensated in local gov-
ernments’ functional load by expanding 
their powers to attract additional sources of 
financing for their own needs (Kunetsova, 
2006). In German federalism the budget-
ing balance is achieved at every level mainly 
through intergovernmental fiscal transfers, 
the surplus of the national gross income is 
redistributed among the subjects of the fed-
eration (Ferber–Baranova, 2009:222–224). 
In this context, the results of the budget re-
form are indicative: in Germany there are 
only three types of intergovernmental fis-
cal federal transfers: in sparsely populated 
federal states, the excessively high (as com-
pared to the average national indicator) 
costs of maintaining public authorities are 
compensated; the “consequences of Ger-
many’s split” are also compensated mainly 
to the eastern federal states until 2020, in-
clusive (Desyatakova–Savinkova, 2014; Ger-
man Bundestag, 2018) and compensation 
is also paid for the effects of structural un-
employment in the eastern states.
According to T.V. Grevtsovo and O.K., 
Garshino, in Germany a balance has been 
achieved between intergovernmental fiscal 
relations by the elimination of territorial in-
equalities due to the reasonable splitting of 
tax revenues (Grevtsova–Garshyna, 2015:8–
10). This is a form of redistribution of the 
national wealth, but the method of its redis-
tribution is considerably deeper than direct 
federal intergovernmental fiscal transfers.
K. Waldhoff and O.S. Morozov conclude 
that German budget equalization combines 
elements of vertical and horizontal align-
ment. The horizontal one is aimed at miti-
gating the difference in the financial poten-
tial of federal subjects and approximates 
the indicators of individual states to the 
average state. The final alignment happens 
at the expense of the above mentioned fed-
eral transfers (Waldhoff, 2015:12–14; Mo-
rozova, 2014:102–104). A closer analysis of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations in Ger-
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many reveals the following structure: the 
division of tax revenues between federal 
and state budgets in a manner predeter-
mined and enshrined in legislation, aimed 
at ensuring the minimum financial stability 
for the subjects of the federation (German 
Bundestag, 2018); and the redistribution of 
VAT revenues between the budgets of the 
various subjects of the federation;
The horizontal equalization of the ex-
penditures of subjects of the federation at 
the expense of redistribution of income 
from taxes on profit of corporations (legal 
entities); additional vertical federal trans-
fers; additional vertical federal grants.
The latter are very rarely used and are 
aimed at stimulating the fiscal independ-
ence and financial capacity of local govern-
ments and state governments.
Sweden’s budget has a simple structure 
but a complex functionality model on two 
levels of government: state and local. The 
latter consists of two types of budgets: sub-
regional local budgets (2 budgets of re-
gions and 18 regions, called “Landsting” 
budgets) and community budgets (over 
290 budgets). Moreover, according to V.V. 
Gryshyn, almost all of the revenues from 
the public services sector in Sweden comes 
from municipal budgets, while the main 
amount of VAT revenues comes from the 
state budget (Gryshyn, 2008:145–148). In-
terestingly, Sweden does not have a regula-
tory function for taxes, that is, they are not 
used as an element of the intergovernmen-
tal fiscal distribution by increasing the vol-
ume of tax revenues from one budget to an-
other. Moreover, the volume and obligation 
of tax collection is determined by the Con-
stitution and is fixed for local government 
bodies, except for VAT refunded from the 
state budget. The communities and Landst-
ings independently determine the amount 
of income tax and administer it themselves.
As Yu.V. Kryvorotko points out, the 
equalization of budgetary security in Swe-
den includes an active process of interac-
tion between local and central authorities 
on the allocation of transfers, which is car-
ried out in the form of consultations of local 
governments with the structures of the cen-
tral government. This allows us to eliminate 
many problems relating to the allocation of 
appropriations, through consensus and the 
traditional Swedish ability to “negotiate” 
(Kryvorotko, 2009:55–59). Considering in 
more detail this thesis attention focuses on 
the following aspect of the implementation 
of the mechanism of intergovernmental fis-
cal equalization in Sweden. The fact is that 
the financial capacity of local government 
bodies is explained precisely by the alloca-
tion of the income tax on the level of the 
community and Landstings. But at the same 
time Sweden is actively using the horizontal 
alignment model, which provides targeted 
and non-targeted transfers: structural, tran-
sitional, regulatory and detachable.
The essence of each of them is that they 
perform a different function of budget 
equalization, and the mechanism of their 
implementation is associated with the con-
sultation procedure between the regional 
authorities and the government, as well as 
between the public authorities of the com-
munities and the government and the re-
gional authorities (Palankai, 2015:55–58). 
In other words, the government can pro-
vide direct transfers to each budget to cover 
financial breakdowns (structural transfer), 
and may provide funds so to speak in a 
batch, to the level of the region with their 
further distribution (transitional transfer).
In the future, as noted by D. Johansson, 
transitional transfer may be transformed 
into a regulatory one, since the latter im-
plies a short-term subsidization of local 
budgets (Juhansson, 2006). T.S. Smyrnova 
points out that a short-term subsidization in 
Sweden is ineffective since it does not have 
a single defined interest rate limit for the 
use of a subvention (Smirnova, 2015:101–
103). In our opinion, the absence of pre-
determined precise and unambiguous prin-
ciples of regulation of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations, and the availability of only 
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the framework of their organization sub-
stantially, expands the capabilities of local 
government bodies, but only those with 
a real economic basis. That is, such a sys-
tem of consensus one way or another, but 
depends on the economic capacity of the 
territory and is not compensated for by the 
functional freedom of the local govern-
ment bodies.
A very interesting element of Sweden’s 
experience in organizing intergovernmen-
tal relations is pointed out by M.O. Morgu-
nova. She makes a focus on the existence 
of a detachable intergovernmental trans-
fer, when the state takes back the unused 
amount of the subvention, but does not 
count it into the state budget and transfers it 
free of charge to another municipal budget 
(Mogunova, 2008:52–55). Admittedly, such 
practice in Sweden is considered an indica-
tor of the ineffectiveness of the functioning 
of local government (Stafren, 2016).
 A wide range of powers in the budget-
ary sphere is assigned to local governments 
on all levels (the region, departments, com-
munities) in the French Constitution: Arti-
cle 46 sets the principles of fiscal policy and 
annual budgeting. Among principle fea-
tures of intergovernmental fiscal relations 
in France the following are distinguished 
most often:
Wide introduction of horizontal inter-
governmental fiscal relations both at a fee 
(interest for providing budget credit) and 
on a royalty-free basis for the purpose of im-
plementing joint projects by various local 
governments (Khramchenko, 2017:65–67);
Intergovernmental fiscal redistribution 
means that several communities and the de-
partment can enter into intergovernmental 
fiscal relations with one another, and the 
regional budgets and departments can par-
ticipate in redistribution programmes. Such 
programmes are accepted by the regional 
authorities and the authorities of the depart-
ment without the participation of the state;
Involvement of civil society institutes in 
the process of formation and implementa-
tion of local budgets and determination 
of the volume of intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers from the state budget to the lev-
el of budgets of local government bodies 
with mandatory control and public super-
vision. The latter is an extremely effective 
tool for intergovernmental fiscal equaliza-
tion in terms of rational use and the pur-
pose of budget expenditures, and therefore 
should act as a control object (Rassylnikov, 
2010:80–82).
Austria’s practice is similar to that of 
France. However, S.V. Korolev emphasizes 
the principle of self-sufficiency, that is, each 
level of public authorities should cover the 
expenditures of regional development by 
proportionate income from the economic 
potential of the region. The allocation of 
competence to spend money to all the 
budget levels entails an appropriate distri-
bution of tax revenues between them. The 
distribution of taxes between the federal 
budget and the budgets of states is estab-
lished by federal law on budget equaliza-
tion and remains valid for five years (Koro-
lyov, 2005:27–29). But it should be noted 
that the share of intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers from the federal budget in the 
income of a state is small and exclusively 
purposeful. There is an extensive system 
of state support programmes for regional 
development, each targeted and financed 
exclusively from the central budget.
Conclusions. An analysis of other coun-
tries’ experiences in regulating intergov-
ernmental fiscal relations demonstrates the 
presence of a number of progressive ele-
ments, which can significantly increase the 
financial capacity of local governments and 
the quality of budget distribution.
Germany’s practice demonstrates the 
effectiveness of vertical additional federal 
transfers and grants, as an element of sta-
bilization of intergovernmental fiscal rela-
tions. Their implementation after horizon-
tal redistribution of budgets in the middle 
of the federal state is aimed at equalizing 
the financial conditions of regional devel-
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opment, and the special transfers for the 
less developed regions of Eastern Germany 
testifies to a strategic vision in regional de-
velopment policy.
Sweden’s practice of allocating powers 
to local governments in tax and general 
administration, including the correlation 
of tax rates, is extremely exploitable. Par-
ticularly relevant is the experience with tax 
revenues, which are traditionally the main 
source of budget revenues, and tax rates, 
instrumental in stimulating entrepreneur-
ial activity in a region.
The widespread implementation of the 
practice of horizontal intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers greatly increases the eco-
nomic potential and financial capacity of 
the regions and regional communities of 
France. The taxpayers’ number, calculated 
during the distribution of the national in-
come surplus is an indicator of the efficien-
cy of the activities of local governments.
From the perspective of financial sec-
tor stability and the model of tax relations, 
for Ukraine we recommend the adoption 
of the Austrian model in determining the 
level and proportions of tax distribution be-
tween budgets of different levels from the 
state for five years.
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